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NOTE 
Social Networking and Freedom of Speech: 
Not “Like” Old Times  
Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012) 
ZACHARY SHKLAR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Facebook is a website that allows users to share photos, news, stories, 
and personal anecdotes from their daily lives in an easy to follow online 
community.1  The website has developed a huge following and just recently 
reached the milestone of having over 1 billion users worldwide.2  Each Face-
book user has a “profile” that typically shares the user’s name, a brief bio-
graphical background, pictures the user has uploaded to the site, a list of the 
user’s Facebook friends, and a list of Facebook “pages” the user has “liked.”3  
Unlike personal “profiles,” Facebook “pages” are set up for various groups, 
such as businesses, organizations, religious groups, political groups, music 
groups, sports teams, and brands in order for them to connect with users and 
share that group’s messages or simply represent their respective identities.4 
With such a large amount of users logged on to Facebook at any given 
time, the website has become an extremely efficient way to communicate 
messages, both commercially and personally.  Accordingly, the website has 
become one of the central means of conveying a message throughout the 
world.  On average, Facebook processes 2.7 billion “likes,” 300 million photo 
uploads, and 2.5 billion status updates every day.5  As Facebook continues to 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2014; Associate 
Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.   
 1. Brief of Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant 
Daniel Ray carter, Jr. and in Support of Vacatur at 3, Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 
2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012) (No. 12-1671) [hereinafter Facebook Amicus Brief], avail-
able at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bland_v._roberts_appeal_-
__facebook_amicus _brief.pdf. 
 2. Aaron Smith, Laurie Segall & Stacy Cowley, Facebook Reaches One Billion 
Users, CNN MONEY (Oct. 4, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology 
/facebook-billion-users/index.html?hpt=hp_bn5. 
 3. Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 4. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, BUSINESSWEEK 
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-04/facebook-the-
making-of-1-billion-users#p2.  
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grow and provide an effective and efficient forum to present thoughts and 
ideas, it is essential that the courts protect these expressions of speech 
through the First Amendment.    
In Bland v. Roberts, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia was presented with the issue of whether “liking” a page on 
Facebook is speech protectable by the First Amendment.6  This Note argues 
that the court’s holding, that “liking” something on Facebook is not worthy of 
First Amendment protection, is a disturbing result that endangers one of our 
most fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  In Part II, this Note 
analyzes the facts and holding of Bland v. Roberts.  Next, in Part III, this 
Note describes in detail how Facebook operates and explains the legal back-
ground of the first amendment and its interaction with online communication.  
Part IV examines the court’s rationale in Bland v. Roberts.  Lastly, Part V 
explains the flaws in the court’s reasoning and provides suggestions to courts 
facing similar controversies in the future. 
II.  FACTS & HOLDING 
Plaintiff Daniel Ray Carter, Jr., worked in the Hampton sheriff’s office 
in Hampton, Virginia, as a sworn, uniformed deputy sheriff.7  Defendant B.J. 
Roberts was the sheriff in that office.8  In November 2009, Roberts was up 
for re-election for the sheriff position.9  Jim Adams, former lieutenant colonel 
in the sheriff’s department, opposed Roberts in the election.10  Roberts won 
the election and subsequently decided not to reappoint Carter.11  Carter al-
leged that in the months leading up to the election, Roberts learned that Carter 
expressed support for his opponent, Adams.12  On March 4, 2011, Carter filed 
suit against Roberts “in his individual and official capacities” in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that Roberts 
violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for supporting 
Adams in the election.13 
Specifically, Carter alleged that Roberts retaliated against him for his 
expressions of support for Adams via Facebook.14  Carter argued that this 
retaliation violated his right to free speech.15 Carter claimed that he sent a 
message of support to Adams on his Facebook page and also “liked” Adams’ 
  
 6. 857 F. Supp. 2d 599. 
 7. Id. at 601. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 602. 
 14. Id. at 602-03. 
 15. Id. 
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page.16  Roberts conceded that he was aware of Carter’s activity on his oppo-
nent’s Facebook page.17 
Roberts claimed that his failure to reappoint Carter after his re-election 
was not retaliatory in nature.18  He asserted that his decision was because of 
Carter’s “unsatisfactory work performance or for [Roberts’] belief that [Car-
ter’s] actions ‘hindered the harmony and efficiency of the [o]ffice.’”19  On 
December 9, 2011, Roberts moved for summary judgment arguing that Carter 
did not adequately allege a free speech violation under the Constitution, and 
alternatively that even if his speech was protected under the First Amend-
ment, Carter failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the retalia-
tion claim.20 
On April 24, 2012, the district court ruled in favor of Roberts’ motion 
for summary judgment on all counts.21  The court found Carter’s evidence of 
his alleged statement of support to be insufficient to support his claim.22  In 
regards to Carter’s “like” of Adams’ Facebook page, the court held that 
merely “liking” a Facebook page does not constitute a substantive statement 
worthy of First Amendment constitutional protection.23 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for redress of grievances.”24  Rights guaranteed under the First 
Amendment, and free speech specifically, have always been some of the most 
cherished rights offered under the Constitution.25  However, despite the fun-
damental nature of the First Amendment, it is also the center of many dis-
  
 16. Id. at 603. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 601-02. 
 19. Id. at 602. 
 20. Id.  Furthermore, Roberts claimed he was entitled to qualified immunity in 
his individual capacity on all claims and sovereign immunity in his official capacity 
on all claims.  Id. 
 21. Id. at 601. 
 22. Id. at 604.  
 23. Id. at 603. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25. In 1920, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]hat freedom of speech and of the press 
are elements of liberty all will acclaim.  Indeed, they are so intimate to liberty in eve-
ryone’s convictions – we may say feelings – that there is an instinctive and instant 
revolt from any limitation of them either by law or a charge under the law.”  Schaefer 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920). 
3
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putes and controversies.26  Since the passage of the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has developed a rather complex set of 
rules and doctrines that have evolved over the last century to govern different 
modes of speech and expression.27   
This Part will begin by describing in detail how Facebook operates.  It 
will also summarize important cases that demonstrate how courts have at-
tempted to reconcile the free speech doctrine with activity online.  Next, this 
Part will briefly explore the difference between traditional pure speech and 
symbolic expression.  Finally, this Part will discuss the rights to free speech 
provided to public employees. 
A.  Facebook 
In order to have a better understanding of the legal issues at play in this 
particular case, it is important to fully understand how Facebook operates.  
When a user logs on to Facebook, he or she typically begins on the home 
page.28  The home page is the starting point for Facebook and contains multi-
ple links that allows users to navigate to different areas of the site.29  Addi-
tionally, the home page contains the “News Feed,” which is the primary place 
a user views and interacts with shared stories and news from his or her fellow 
Facebook friends or followed pages.30  The user’s News Feed is a customiza-
ble and continuously updated flow of posts made by the user’s friends and 
selected pages.31  Every time a user makes a comment or shares a story, it is 
placed in his or her friends’ News Feeds for their viewing pleasure.32 
An additional feature of the Facebook website is the “like” button, 
which is represented by a thumbs-up icon.33  The “like” button is placed un-
derneath many types of content on Facebook, including user comments and 
group pages.34  By clicking the “like” button, the user generates a “like story” 
which is placed on that user’s profile page and additionally could appear in  
friends’ News Feed.35  “For example, if Jane Smith [l]iked the UNICEF 
Facebook page, the statement ‘Jane Smith likes UNICEF’ would appear on 
her profile page along with the title of the [p]age and an icon selected by the 
  
 26. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:1 
(West 2012). 
 27. Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1566, 1566 (2003) (reviewing ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN 
ERA (Lee C. Bollinger & Goeffrey R. Stone eds., 2003)).  
 28. Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 6. 
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[p]age’s administrator.”36  If a fellow user were to click on the title of the 
page or icon, it would bring him or her to that particular Facebook page just 
like a hyperlink.37  When the “like [s]tory” is placed on the user’s friends’ 
News Feeds, it appears with that user’s name and profile picture to clearly 
indicate who likes that particular page.38 
With a more complete understanding of how Facebook operates, it will 
be easier for courts to determine what message a user is trying to send when 
he or she posts something on Facebook, including “liking” a page or story.  
B.  Free Speech on the Internet and Facebook 
Today’s Internet era ushers in many new questions concerning free 
speech.  The Supreme Court of the United States must now determine what 
kind of Internet activity should be protected under the First Amendment.  The 
Court has observed that “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication 
and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but 
in what society accepts as proper behavior.”39  All courts are going to be con-
tinuously challenged as the Internet era continues to change how people 
communicate their ideas to the world. 
In 1997, Reno v. ACLU40 answered an important inquiry – whether 
speech on the Internet should be viewed just like any other speech covered 
under the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court of the United States ruled 
that speech conducted on the Internet should be treated no differently than 
any other, more traditional avenues of speech.41  Years later the Court re-
emphasized the importance of communications on the Internet and its subse-
quent protection stating, “[t]he [i]nternet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diver-
sity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”42 
The decision in Reno has paved the way for many activities on the In-
ternet to be deemed worthy of First Amendment protection by lower courts.  
The Second Circuit in Universal City Studios v. Corley held that posting a 
hyperlink online was speech protectable under free speech principles.43  T.V. 
v. Smith-Green Community School Corporation held that the posting of pho-
tos to Facebook was protected speech.44  J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010). 
 40. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 41. Id. at 870. 
 42. Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (Supp. V 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 44. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
5
Shklar: Shklar: Social Networking and Freedom
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: ShklarPaginated.docx Created on:  10/31/13 8:08 PM Last Printed: 11/6/13 8:36 PM 
670 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
District similarly held that uploading a video to YouTube qualified as 
speech.45 
Facebook played a central role in two other recently decided cases re-
garding free speech on the Internet.  In Mattingly v. Milligan,46 Mattingly 
posted comments on her Facebook page referring directly to the firing of 
various employees.47  The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Arkansas ruled that Mattingly’s post was an expression of constitutionally 
protected speech.48  Similarly, in Gresham v. City of Atlanta,49 the district 
court ruled that a plaintiff’s post on Facebook describing the arrest of a police 
officer’s son for fraud should be considered speech on a matter of public con-
cern.50 
While Mattingly and Gresham illustrate that free speech protection is 
available to Facebook users for actual statements made on the site, the cases 
do not address the central issue in Bland v. Roberts, which asks whether “lik-
ing” something on Facebook can be protected under the First Amendment.51   
C.  Pure Speech Versus Symbolic Expression 
This subsection will briefly discuss the differences between the protec-
tions offered for traditional, or pure speech, and speech that falls under the 
category of symbolic expression.  The distinctions are important because 
activity on the Internet may fall under either category of speech, each of 
which has a different set of rules a court must follow.  
The most basic and straightforward application of free speech occurs in 
cases involving pure speech.  Pure speech is entitled to “comprehensive pro-
tection.”52  This means the government cannot regulate pure speech based on 
the speech’s content.53  For example, the government could not make a law 
outlawing books on how to legally avoid paying taxes.54  Pure speech gener-
ally encompasses words that are spoken or written, including “books, maga-
zines, newspapers, radio, television, [and] public speeches.”55  
  
 45. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 46. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11 CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. 
Ark. Nov. 1, 2011). 
 47. Id. at *2-3. 
 48. Id. at *3-4. 
 49. Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 50. Id. at *2.  
 51. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603-04 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
 52. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 53. Free Speech (Supreme Court Drama), ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/free-
speech-reference/freedom-speech-299523 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
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One area of pure speech that has been particularly well protected is po-
litically oriented speech.  In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,56 the 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed a fine imposed on a pamphleteer 
who distributed an anonymous pamphlet opposing a proposed school tax 
levy.57  The Court reasoned: 
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of govern-
ment established by our Constitution.  The First Amendment af-
fords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 
to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people.58 
The Court recently reiterated this view in the landmark case Citizens United 
v. Federal Elections Commission,59 by stating political speech “is central to 
the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”60 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also long held that putting 
up a political sign on a private residence warrants protection under the free 
speech doctrine as pure speech.61  In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court stated 
that when a citizen places a sign at a residence, it creates “a message quite 
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else . . . [S]uch signs provide 
information about the identity of the ‘speaker.’”62  In addition, “[r]esidential 
signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication.  Espe-
cially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign 
may have no practical substitute.”63 
Beyond pure speech, the First Amendment free speech doctrine also 
protects symbolic expression.64  The Supreme Court of the United States in 
Texas v. Johnson stated, “[t]he First Amendment literally forbids the abridg-
ment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does 
not end at the spoken or written word.”65  Symbolic expression encompasses 
activities such as gestures and conduct.66  For instance, the Supreme Court in 
  
 56. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 57. Id. at 357. 
 58. Id. at 346 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 59. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 60. Id. at 892. 
 61. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994). 
 62. Id. at 56. 
 63. Id. at 57. 
 64. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989). 
 65. Id. at 404. 
 66. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008). 
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette67 held that refusing to 
recite the pledge of allegiance was protected by free speech.68  The Court 
went on to say, “[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicat-
ing ideas.  The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, 
institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.”69 
Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States has demon-
strated the breadth of activities that may constitute protected symbolic ex-
pression.  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,70 
the Court held that wearing black armbands was symbolic speech “closely 
akin to ‘pure speech.’”71  In Schacht v. United States,72 the wearing of a mili-
tary uniform in an attempt to criticize American involvement in Vietnam was 
held as protected speech.73  A sit-in by African Americans in a whites-only 
area to protest segregation was held to be symbolic speech in Brown v. Lou-
isiana.74  Texas v. Johnson held that the burning of the American flag was 
protected as symbolic free speech as well.75 
The problem that arises for courts is deciding what type of behavior and 
activity is truly worthy of being protected as symbolic expression.  As the 
Supreme Court of the United States has pointed out, “[i]t is possible to find 
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes – for 
example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall 
– but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection 
of the First Amendment.”76  The modern test for what constitutes symbolic 
expression is derived from Spence v. Washington.77  In protest of the United 
States’ invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University, 
Spence hung an American flag upside-down from his residence with a peace 
sign affixed to the flag.78  Spence’s stated purpose was to show that America 
stood for peace instead of war and violence.79  He was convicted under a 
Washington state statute that penalized the improper display of an American 
flag.80  The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and found that Spence 
had engaged in symbolic expression worthy of First Amendment protection.81  
  
 67. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 68. Id. at 642. 
 69. Id. at 632. 
 70. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 71. Id. at 505-06. 
 72. 398 U.S. 58 (1970). 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966). 
 75. 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989). 
 76. City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 77. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
 78. Id. at 405, 407-08. 
 79. Id. at 408. 
 80. Id. at 406-07. 
 81. Id. at 415. 
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The Court defined symbolic speech as being “imbued with elements of com-
munication” with “a particularized message” as to which “the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”82  
D.  Speech by Public Employees 
Regardless of whether the speech being analyzed is pure speech or sym-
bolic expression, the context of where the speech is delivered is also of great 
importance.83  Otherwise protectable speech may not receive protection if the 
speech occurs in a place where the government has a sufficient interest in 
regulating that speech, such as a public school or public place of employment. 
Pickering v. Board of Education84 developed special rules about what 
speech can be protected in the case of public employees.85  In Pickering, a 
teacher made comments to a newspaper criticizing the school administra-
tion’s proposals to raise new revenues for the school.86  As a result, she was 
fired.87  The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the teacher’s termination, stating 
that the comments were detrimental to the best interests of the school.88  The 
Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, concluding that public em-
ployees do not “relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise 
enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.”89  The Court 
stated that these First Amendment rights can be defeated if they are out-
weighed by the government’s interests, as an employer, in the operation of 
the public workplace and the efficient delivery of public services by public 
employees.90  However, the public interest in “having free and unhindered 
debate on matters of public importance – the core value of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment – is . . . great . . . .”91 
The Supreme Court has defined public concern as speech that is the 
“subject of legitimate news interest” and speech that is the “subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public . . . .”92  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has added, “[t]o deserve First Amendment protection, it is 
sufficient that the speech concern matters in which even a relatively small 
segment of the general public might be interested.”93  One such topic that has 
  
 82. Id. at 409-11. 
 83. Id. at 410. 
 84. 391 U.S. 563 (1995). 
 85. See generally id. 
 86. Id. at 564. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 565. 
 89. Id. at 568. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 573. 
 92. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004). 
 93. Roe v. City of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Dishnow v. 
Sch. Dist., 77 F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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consistently been held to be a matter of public concern is a public employee’s 
speech on the merits of a candidate for public office.94  Courts have even 
gone so far as to recognize that public employees are often in the best posi-
tion to make comments on political candidates.95 
The Fourth Circuit uses the test developed in McVey v. Stacey, its ver-
sion of the Pickering test, to determine if speech regards a matter of public 
concern.96  McVey established that a public employee must show:  
(1) whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen upon a 
matter of public concern or as an employee about a matter of per-
sonal interest; (2) whether the employee’s interest in speaking . . . 
outweighed the government’s interest in providing effective and 
efficient services to the public; and (3) whether the employee’s 
speech was a substantial factor in the employee’s termination deci-
sion.97 
Public employee speech on matters of public concern is subject to ex-
ception.98  In Garcetti v. Ceballos, a deputy district attorney claimed he was 
retaliated against for writing his opinions to his superiors on what he per-
ceived to be an inaccurate warrant being used in a prosecution by his office.99  
The appellate court held that governmental misconduct, such as Ceballos 
alleged, was “inherently a matter of public concern” and protected free 
speech.100  The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, noting that the 
appellate court did not consider whether Ceballos’ speech was made in his 
capacity as a private citizen or in his role as an employee.101  The Court stated 
that “a public employee’s speech is deprived of First Amendment protection 
whenever those views are expressed, to government workers or others, pursu-
  
 94. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (characterizing issues 
of public concern as subjects “relating to any matter of political, social, or other con-
cern to the community”); Conley v. Elkton, 190 Fed. App’x 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished) (discussing comment by deputy to bystander concerning whom he 
should vote for Sheriff was a matter of public concern); Orga v. Williams, 996 F.2d 
1211 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (stating speech regarding who was most qualified 
to be Sheriff is undoubtedly protected).  
 95. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (“Government em-
ployees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they 
work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions”); Sanjour v. EPA, 
56 F.3d 85, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[G]overnment employees are in a position to offer 
the public unique insights into the workings of government generally and their areas 
of specialization in particular.”). 
 96. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 1998).  
 97. Id. at 277-78.  
 98. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 99. Id. at 414-15. 
 100. Id. at 416. 
 101. Id.  
10
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ant to an employment responsibility.”102  The Court found that a part of Ce-
ballos’ duties as a calendar deputy was to exercise “supervisory responsibili-
ties over other lawyers.”103  Accordingly, his memo alleging misconduct was 
made under his role as an employee and not as a private citizen and thus not 
worthy of First Amendment protection.104 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Bland v. Roberts, the court began its analysis by determining the 
standard Carter needed to prove in order to recover for his freedom of speech 
retaliation claim.105  In order to obtain relief, Carter had to satisfy the test 
developed in McVey v. Stacey.106  The court stated that if the first prong of the 
McVey test was not satisfied,107 the remaining prongs did not need to be ana-
lyzed, as there would be no speech worthy of protection.108 
The court ruled that Carter failed to satisfy the first prong of the McVey 
test, meaning the court did not believe that Carter had engaged in speech as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern.109  While the court acknowledged that 
Roberts was aware of Carter’s “like” of his opponents Facebook page, the 
court found it to be irrelevant.110  Since the court did not consider Carter’s 
“like” to be speech, Roberts’ admission of his awareness of the “like” had no 
bearing on the analysis.111  The court concluded “that merely ‘liking’ a Face-
book page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”112 
Citing Mattingly v. Milligan and Gresham v. City of Atlanta, the court 
acknowledged that other courts have found certain activity on Facebook to be 
constitutionally protected speech.113 The court distinguished the current fact 
pattern because “[b]oth Gresham and Mattingly involved actual state-
ments.”114  The court claimed that “liking” a Facebook page does not amount 
  
 102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Id. at 413.  
 104. Id. at 421. 
 105. 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602-03 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
 106. Id. 
 107. The first prong is “whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen 
upon a matter of public concern or as an employee about a matter of personal inter-
est.”  McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998); see also supra Part 
III.C. 
 108. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 603-04.  For more detail on these cases, see supra Part III.A. 
 114. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604.  
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to an actual statement such as those protected in Mattingly and Gresham.115  
The court stated:   
Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient.  It is not the kind of 
substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional 
protection.  The [c]ourt will not attempt to infer the actual content 
of Carter’s posts from one click of a button on Adams’ Facebook 
page.  For the [c]ourt to assume that the [p]laintiff[] made some 
specific statement without evidence of such statements is im-
proper.116   
Because the court ruled that Carter’s “like” was not sufficient speech to 
warrant protection under the First Amendment, the court granted Roberts’ 
motion for summary judgment.117 
V.  COMMENT 
The district court’s curtailed and conclusory analysis of the First 
Amendment issue in Bland v. Roberts did not adequately represent the dec-
ades of free speech precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Carter’s Internet activity should have been protected under the free speech 
doctrine just like other forms of pure speech.118  Even if the court were un-
willing to classify “liking” something on Facebook as pure speech, Carter’s 
activity surely then should have fallen under the category of symbolic expres-
sion.119  In today’s society, as the Internet continues to expand into almost 
every facet of our daily lives, judicial decisions that fail to comprehend the 
true nature of Internet activity pose a serious threat to the liberties guaranteed 
by the First Amendment.   
This Part will begin by pointing out the flawed reasoning of the court, 
which led it to a holding that cannot be sustained under the current interpreta-
tion of the free speech doctrine.  This Part will conclude with what conflicts 
courts should expect going forward in the ever growing Internet era as well as 
a guide of how to best handle these conflicts. 
  
 115. See id.  Interestingly, the court did not engage in any discussion of whether 
the “like” could qualify as an act of symbolic expression because the plaintiffs did not 
“sufficiently allege[] that they engaged in expressive speech.”  Id. at 602. 
 116. Id. at 604. 
 117. Id. at 610.  
 118. See supra Part III.C. 
 119. See supra Part III.C. 
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A.  The Court’s Misguided Opinion 
The court made two mistakes in analyzing whether a “like” should be 
protected under the free speech doctrine.  First, the court mistakenly con-
cluded that “liking” a page on Facebook does not amount to an actual state-
ment.  Second, the court failed to consider if Carter’s Facebook activity con-
stituted symbolic expression. 
1.  Failing to Recognize a “Like” as a Statement 
With the basic understanding of how Facebook operates, it is easy to see 
the flaws in the court’s opinion.  The court claimed that “merely ‘liking’ a 
Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”120  
Furthermore, the court distinguished this case from other Facebook cases 
where free speech protection was granted because those cases “involved ac-
tual statements.”121  The court was simply wrong to view “liking” a political 
candidate’s Facebook page as not engaging in an actual statement.  When 
Carter “liked” Jim Adams’ Facebook page, the “like [s]tory” was published 
on Carter’s Facebook profile page.122  This ensured that any Facebook user 
who visited Carter’s profile page would see the words “Daniel Carter likes 
Jim Adams for Hampton Sheriff.”123  Furthermore, by “liking” Adams’ page, 
Carter also ensured that an announcement would appear on his friends’ News 
Feeds comprised of the same words that appeared on his profile page, and 
would even be accompanied by Carter’s picture to clearly identify the source 
of the words.124  
The court further justified its view that Carter’s activity was not an ac-
tual statement by stating, “[t]he [c]ourt will not attempt to infer the actual 
content of Carter’s posts from one click of a button on Adams’ Facebook 
page.  For the [c]ourt to assume that the [p]laintiff[] made some specific 
statement without evidence of such statements is improper.”125  The problem 
with this reasoning, however, is that the court simply did not have to make 
any inferences nor did it lack evidence of the content of Carter’s statement.  
As explained above, the actual content of Carter’s “like” was the statement 
“Daniel Carter likes Jim Adams for Hampton Sheriff.”  The court did not 
need to make any further inferences to decipher Carter’s speech.  It should 
  
 120. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603.    
 121. Id. at 604.  
 122. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.  “Jim Adams for Hampton 
Sheriff” was the title of the Jim Adams’ Facebook Page.  Jim Adams for Hampton 
Sheriff, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Jim-Adams-for-Hampton-
Sheriff/101482822031 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).  
 124. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
 125. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604.   
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not matter that Carter accomplished making an actual statement through one 
click of the button rather than through multiple keystrokes; the message was 
the same.  Just because Carter accomplished his message in a more efficient 
manner does not mean that he did not engage in speech worthy of protection. 
If the court had recognized the fact that Carter generated an actual 
statement by clicking the “like” button, then the only rational holding would 
have been to grant free speech protection to the “like” as a statement of pure 
speech.  Carter’s endorsement of a political candidate on Facebook through 
“liking” the candidate’s page should be treated no differently than if he had 
put up a sign on his front yard stating, “I like Jim Adams for Hampton Sher-
iff.”   
As previously above, the Supreme Court of the United States has held 
that putting a political sign at a private residence warrants protection.126  The 
Court’s rationale for recognizing free speech for political residential signs 
should apply with equal strength to “liking” a political candidate’s Facebook 
page.  “Liking” a Facebook page provides information about the identity of 
the speaker since the content of the speech is located on that user’s own pro-
file and is even accompanied by a picture of the speaker.127  Additionally, 
there is absolutely no cost associated with “liking” a page on Facebook and is 
ultimately even more convenient than putting up a sign in the front yard or 
window.  “Liking” a page on Facebook should therefore be treated just as 
favorably by the courts as putting up a sign on residential property. 
In its analysis, the court also proclaimed “[s]imply liking a Facebook 
page . . . is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously war-
ranted constitutional protection.”128  The court here was again mistaken as the 
Supreme Court of the United States has found that the First Amendment is 
not limited to “substantive statements.”129  In fact, the Court has expressly 
stated that a “succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitu-
tional protection.”130  Additionally, political endorsements need not be elabo-
  
 126. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
 128. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604.  
 129. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545-47 (2012) (rejecting 
argument that the limited value of false statements exempts them from First Amend-
ment protection); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“Most of 
what we say to one another lacks religious, political, scientific, educational, journalis-
tic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from 
government regulation.” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); IMS 
Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The First Amendment 
protects ‘[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic 
expression.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 
273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001))), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 130. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-Sexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995). 
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rate or detailed in order to constitute speech.131  As City of Ladue demon-
strates, a simple sign endorsing a preferred candidate is enough.132  Carter’s 
“like” of Adams’ Facebook page therefore is indeed the kind of “substantive 
statement” that has previously been granted protection.  
2.  Failing to Consider Symbolic Expression 
Even if the court refuses to acknowledge that “liking” a Facebook page 
comprises pure speech, the activity should fall under the umbrella of sym-
bolic expression.  Surprisingly, nowhere in the opinion did the court even 
consider Carter’s actions as symbolic expression.  As previously noted, the 
free speech doctrine goes beyond the written and spoken word and encom-
passes many other human actions.133  Undoubtedly, Carter’s “like” of Adams’ 
Facebook page should constitute symbolic expression.  Clearly, the intent of 
Carter’s activity was to convey the particularized message that he supported 
Adams for Hampton sheriff. 
Furthermore, Facebook users clearly understand the meaning of clicking 
the “like” button.134  Even non-Facebook users would have an easy time un-
derstanding the message conveyed by “liking” a political candidate’s Face-
book page.  The word “like” is used proficiently in the English language and 
conveys the exact same meaning in this context as its common everyday us-
age.  Finally, “liking” something on Facebook is also accompanied with the 
universal sign of approval – the thumbs-up symbol.  Thus, even if the court 
was unwilling to say Carter engaged in actual pure speech, his activity still 
conveyed an actual message that was understandable to the public and should 
therefore have been covered by the free speech doctrine as symbolic expres-
sion.   
B.  Going Forward 
Currently, three out of every four Americans use some sort of social 
media.135  This percentage should continue to rise as the Internet continues to 
evolve.  As mentioned above, this court’s interpretation of the First Amend-
ment and how the doctrine relates to the online community presents great 
concerns.  It is essential that courts in the future spend greater effort in fully 
understanding how United States citizens use the Internet in communicating 
  
 131. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 132. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994). 
 133. See supra Part III.C. 
 134. Every minute there are over 300,000 “likes” on Facebook.  One Minute on 
Facebook, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,711054024001_ 
2037229,00.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 135. Ethan Zelizer, Embracing and Controlling Social Media in the Workplace, 
CBA REC., Nov. 2010, at 52, 53. 
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ideas instead of reaching conclusory decisions such as in the instant decision.  
The judicial system should have ample opportunities to explore this topic in 
future decisions as free speech issues relating to Internet activity will doubt-
lessly continue to fill up dockets.   
Incidents involving political campaigns on social media websites and 
free speech, such as the conflict between Carter and Roberts, are bound to 
arise.  In 2006, Facebook for the first time allowed candidates to create cam-
paign pages dedicated to rally support for his or her election.136  Those pages 
ended up playing a significant role in congressional elections and in the 
presidential election in 2008.137  During the 2012 presidential campaign,  
candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney both used Facebook applications 
and pages to gather support.138  Social media websites give political candi-
dates the ability to reach millions of voters they never had access to in the 
past.139  With the increased amount of campaigning on sites such as Face-
book, speech commenting on these campaigns will continue to rise online as 
well.  This online political commentary deserves the same protection as has 
been given traditional political speech.140   
The problem will lie in how Internet users effectuate their political mes-
sage on the Internet.  Simple typed messages on social media websites should 
not present courts many challenges in applying the doctrine of free speech.141  
But more nuanced mechanisms, such as “liking” something on Facebook, to 
convey a political message may present more of a problem for the courts.  To 
make matters even more complicated, technology is rapidly changing and 
new methods for conveying a message will continually be developed.  For 
instance, along with the “like” button, Facebook also has the option to 
“share” a story.142  For example, if Carter saw an article online entitled “Why 
You Should Oppose Sherriff Roberts for Re-election”, he could share it with 
his Facebook friends by clicking the “share” button.  When this happens, 
Facebook would post on Carter’s profile page and in his friends’ News Feeds 
the words “Carter shared the article ‘[W]hy You Should Oppose Sheriff Rob-
erts for Re-election.”  While “sharing” a story on Facebook seems similar to 
“liking” a story on Facebook, the latter seems to be speech comprised of part 
  
 136. Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 12. 
 137. Id.; see Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology 
and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 659, 659 n.79 (2009). 
 138. Sara Burnett, GOP, Democrats Take Political Scrap Online, THE DENVER 
POST, May 28, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_20724874/gop-.  
 139. See id. 
 140. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. 
Ark. Nov. 1, 2011); Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 
4601020 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 142. See How Sharing Works, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/ 
sharing (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
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advocacy and part information sharing, while the former is simply informa-
tion sharing.  Should the two activities receive the same treatment?143 
Even more mind boggling, Facebook recently developed technology that 
automatically posts in a user’s friends’ News Feeds whenever the user read an 
article or watched a video online without ever having to click a “like” or 
“share” button.144  For example, if Carter read a New York Times article on-
line entitled “Why Sheriff Roberts is Evil,” Facebook would post on Carter’s 
profile page and in his friends’ News Feeds, “Carter read ‘Why Sheriff Rob-
erts is Evil.’”  Should this sort of activity be given free speech protection?  
The message delivered by this activity may be less clear to the public as the 
previous example.  Should a court assume that Carter was making some sort 
of conveyable message just because he read an article online?   
In the imminent future, many challenging Internet free speech issues 
will be presented to courts.  The proper first step for any court presented with 
such a challenge should be to fully comprehend the Internet activity being 
scrutinized before trying to apply the appropriate free speech principles.  
Without fully understanding what the citizen actually did on the Internet, and 
the motivation and intent behind that particular activity, it is almost impossi-
ble for a court to correctly conduct the proper First Amendment analysis.145  
This type of misunderstanding is what led an erroneous holding in the instant 
decision.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment doctrine of free speech is a bedrock principle in 
the United States.  Free speech is one of the core liberties that underlies our 
democracy and protects against the tyranny of an overreaching government, 
and as such, deserves the utmost protection.  If followed, the court’s holding 
in Bland v. Roberts endangers the decades of precedent established by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and clouds the future of free speech in 
this country. 
The court failed to comprehend that activity on the Internet, such as 
“liking” a page on Facebook, is simply a new means for people to communi-
cate ideas in an efficient and effective manner.  Internet expression and 
speech deserve the same treatment by the courts as more traditional avenues 
of speech.  It should not matter how a person accomplishes the communica-
tion of a message; be it through oral speech on a street corner, a book printed 
  
 143. Sharing a story on Facebook appears strikingly similar to posting a hyperlink 
online which the court has deemed constitutional in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449, 457-58 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 144. Burnett, supra note 138. 
 145. This responsibility should be even more vital for an attorney representing a 
client claiming free speech as a defense.  A zealous advocate should not leave the 
Court in a position to misunderstand the online expressions of his or her client. 
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on Gutenberg’s printing press, a set of moving images shot through a film 
recorder, a symbol flown from a window, or a message sent through the click 
of a mouse.  If a person is communicating an idea that others will compre-
hend, it deserves First Amendment protection.  It is impossible to predict 
what new technologies the future will bring, but we know for certain that 
methods we use to communicate will continually evolve just as they have for 
thousands of years.  If courts are unwilling to adapt to these changes, then we 
risk losing one of our most cherished freedoms. 
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